Author: Kolstad, Ivar

Source: Applied Economics Letters, Volume 16, Number 4, March 2009 , pp. 439-442(4)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Abstract:

Two types of models are dominant in the current resource curse literature. One type of model studies the selection of entrepreneurs into rent-seeking versus productive activities. The other type analyses the use of patronage by politicians seeking re-election. The policy implications of the two models are quite different. The first model suggests that institutions governing the private sector ought to be improved. The second model suggests that institutions governing the public sector should be emphasized. This article empirically tests the impact of the private versus public sector institutions on the resource curse, using cross-country data from Sachs and Warner (1997a) and Polity IV. The main result is that only improved private sector institutions ameliorate the resource curse.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17446540802167339

Affiliations: 1: Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway

Publication date: 2009-03-01

More about this publication?

• Editorial Board
• Information for Authors
• Subscribe to this Title
• ingentaconnect is not responsible for the content or availability of external websites

Related content

• In this: publication
• By this: publisher
• In this Subject: Economics
• By this author: Kolstad, Ivar

Website © Publishing Technology. Article copyright remains with the publisher, society or author(s) as specified within the article.

• Terms and conditions
• Privacy policy
• Information for advertisers