@article {Shiu:2014:0003-6846:3389,
title = "Two separated effects of employer-provided health insurance on job mobility",
journal = "Applied Economics",
parent_itemid = "infobike://routledg/raef",
publishercode ="routledg",
year = "2014",
volume = "46",
number = "28",
publication date ="2014-10-02T00:00:00",
pages = "3389-3407",
itemtype = "ARTICLE",
issn = "0003-6846",
eissn = "1466-4283",
url = "https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/raef/2014/00000046/00000028/art00002",
doi = "doi:10.1080/00036846.2014.929625",
keyword = "health dynamics, employer-provided health insurance, J21, endogenous selection, J24, labour market efficiency, job mobility, I10",
author = "Shiu",
abstract = "We estimate the effect of employer-provided health insurance (EPHI) on job mobility via a dynamic model of joint employment and health insurance decision in the presence of uncertainty about wage rate and health status transitions. The model is based on a Markov decision process in
which a hedonic wage approach provides an economic rationale for the different choices and health insurance serves as an input to the health production process. Including health transitions in the model helps us to understand how the availability of EPHI (positive job characteristic) and holding
EPHI (the wage-health insurance trade-off) enter into the individuals decisions. The model is estimated using the 19992000 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey panel 4, and the results show that the pure effects of holding EPHI are negligible, the full
effects of EPHI are significant and the degrees of the inefficiency vary between 14% and 25% across different states.",
}