This article examines the prices paid for 700 MHz licenses in recent Federal Communications Commission auctions. Econometric modelling confirms the presence of economies of scale and scope in wireless spectrum valuations. That is, higher prices are recorded for areas with large
populations, whilst lower prices are realized for geographically large areas. Also, smaller geographic license areas appear to meet bidders’ demand more effectively, and licenses in areas with high incomes are sold at higher prices. Not surprisingly, more strict deployment requirements
and the presence of harmful technical interference reduce prices. Also, paired spectrum receives higher prices than unpaired spectrum. Interestingly, high minimum opening bids and upfront deposits are associated with higher prices. Finally, competitive bidding places upward pressure on prices.
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FCC 700 MHz auctions;
Document Type: Research Article
Department of Econometrics and Quantitative Modeling, Curtin University, Perth, Australia
Department of Technology Management and Economics, Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg, Sweden
Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand
Communication Economics and Electronic Markets, Centre for Research in Applied Economics, Curtin University, Perth, Australia
Publication date: 2014-06-13
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