Full privatization through controlling rights transfer in China: the extent of its success
Abstract:This article investigates the effect of the second step of privatization in China, which is full privatization through controlling rights transfer after share issue partial privatization. It finds that fully privatized firms perform worse than state-controlled enterprises. Expropriation by private block shareholders is greater than that by state block shareholders. Furthermore, increase in expropriation is negatively related to performance change. The results suggest that full privatization may not yield the expected efficiency gains in transition economies with weak legal system. They also emphasize the importance of preventing private block shareholders from exploiting minority shareholders in the process of full privatization.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: 1: School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China 2: College of Business Administration, University of Rhode Island, Kingston,RI 02881, USA 3: Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
Publication date: 2013-05-01