Skip to main content

Experimental duopolies under price guarantees

Buy Article:

$47.50 plus tax (Refund Policy)

In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs (‘aggressive’ and ‘soft’ price-beating and price-matching) are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy. Our results show that PGs may lead close to the collusive outcome, depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the ‘aggressive’ price-beating type.
No Reference information available - sign in for access.
No Citation information available - sign in for access.
No Supplementary Data.
No Article Media
No Metrics

Keywords: C91; L11; experimental duopolies; price guarantees; product differentiation

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: 1: School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK 2: Department of Economics,Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain 3: Universidad de Valencia, Economia Aplicada II, Avda. de los Naranjos s/nValencia 46022, Spain 4: Department of Economics,University Jaume I, Av. Vicent Sos Baynat, s/nCastellon 12071, Spain

Publication date: 2013-01-01

More about this publication?
  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more