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Property tax shifting under imperfect competition

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The hedonic price models are commonly used to empirically assess the degree to which property taxes are shifted from property owners to property renters. The findings of these studies vary sporadically in terms of the degree of tax shifting. The competitiveness of housing markets may significantly influence the degree of tax shifting. In this article, we allow a nonzero price-cost markup in the hedonic price equation and examine the impact of market power on property tax shifting. In our case study, we examine the property-specific characteristics, occupancy record and local property tax associated with hundreds of managed rental properties in central New Hampshire. The results show that, depending on the degree of market power exercised by a property management firm, the anti-competitive structure of the market may significantly contribute to property tax shifting from property owners to property renters.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: 1: JP Morgan Chase & Co, Columbus, OH, USA 2: Department of Economics, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NC, USA

Publication date: 2011-01-01

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