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The use of stock-based pay for sorting: an empirical analysis of compensation for new CEOs

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Examining stock-based compensation for newly hired CEOs, this article finds that the sensitivity of stock-based pay to performance is higher for new economy, young and volatile firms. Of the components of stock-based pay, it is option grants that generate such variation across firms. It also finds that this cross-firm variation in pay-performance sensitivity is more pronounced for the CEO's first year in office. These findings support the view that firms use stock-based pay to new CEOs for sorting.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Economics, Sogang University, Seoul 121-742, Korea

Publication date: 2010-09-01

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