In a market where imperfect competition occurs as a result of mergers, this study proposes a framework consisting of both efficiency and risk analyses that allow the simulation of pro forma mergers and hence the determination of the optimal number of firms in the industry. This is valuable policy information for regulators concerned with possible intervention in the case of competition and anti-trust violations, and also for business managers seeking acquisition targets. The framework is applied to the banking industry in Taiwan. Results reveal the potential for industrial restructuring in a sector where the optimal number of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) is between four and six, subject to whether partial control is assumed.
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Document Type: Research Article
Department of Banking and Finance, National Chi-Nan University, Puli, Nantou Hsien 545, Taiwan
Department of Banking and Finance, National Chi-Nan University and Takming College, Puli, Nantou Hsien 545, Taiwan
Publication date: 2008-09-01
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