Ownership structure, board composition and the market for corporate control in the UK: an empirical analysis
This paper analyses the board composition and ownership structures of a sample of companies that have been acquired and those of a matching control sample that have not. We find significant governance differences between acquired firms and the control sample. Firms with the following characteristics were more likely to be acquired: they had the same person acting as CEO and chair, a higher proportion of non-executive directors, larger institutional shareholdings and higher director shareholdings. An analysis of small firms also found evidence of higher CEO shareholdings. We also find that treating all take-overs as a single group leads to a model mis-specification which does not identify the incentive effects of board and CEO shareholdings present in non-hostile acquisitions. These results are consistent with two agency-derived hypotheses, financial incentives and effective monitoring. We also find that targets exhibit lower growth potential but do not have worse accounting performance.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Aberdeen Business School, Robert Gordon University, Garthdee Road, Aberdeen AB10 7QE, Scotland, UK
Publication date: 10 November 2003