Counter-Insurgency amid Fragmentation: The British in Southern Iraq

Author: Rangwala, Glen

Source: Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 32, Number 3, June 2009 , pp. 495-513(19)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

Counter-insurgency is conventionally framed in terms of support for legitimate government against violent opposition. The case of Iraq since 2003 presents the problem of how counter-insurgency can be rethought when the structures of government are often starkly divided against each other. Iraq has experienced periods in which local and national government, and different government ministries, have competed, including through the use of armed force, each claiming the authority over particular geographical areas or governance sectors. The British approach in southern Iraq has been one of making pragmatic alliances with specific parts of government, but this has also led UK forces into confrontations that do not easily fit into existing doctrines of counter-insurgency.

Keywords: Iraq; Counter-insurgency; Basra

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390902928321

Affiliations: 1: University of Cambridge, UK

Publication date: 2009-06-01