Author: Biddle, Stephen

Source: Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 30, Number 1, February 2007 , pp. 3-46(44)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Abstract:

Many believe that US speed, precision, and situation awareness account for low Coalition casualties and limited damage to Iraqi infrastructure in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The details of the campaign's actual conduct, however, suggest otherwise. An analysis using evidence collected in a series of 176 interviews with a wide range of campaign participants from both sides of the conflict suggests that Iraqi weaknesses, and not just US strengths, may have been necessary preconditions for the initial campaign's low cost - a finding with very different implications for defense policy than the prevailing view.

Keywords: Iraq; transformation; and revolution in military affairs

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390701210749

Publication date: 2007-02-01

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