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Negative Agenda Control and Executive–Legislative Relations in East Central Europe, 1997–2008

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The article studies the patterns of executive–legislative relations in east-central Europe. In contrast to much of the existing research, it focuses on negative – rather than positive – agenda control to examine the dominant mode of interaction between parliaments and executives. Based on an original review of legislative rules in six east central European states, it shows that the opportunities for governing parties to exclude opposition initiatives from floor deliberations vary with party system concentration. In states with concentrated party systems, such as Hungary and Poland, governing majorities have extensive procedural opportunities to block opposition initiatives from reaching the floor. In countries with more fragmented party systems, such as Estonia and Slovakia, opportunities for negative agenda control are the scarcest.
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Keywords: Europe; agenda control; legislative rules; parliaments

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, UK

Publication date: 01 June 2011

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