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The Role of Incentive Design in Parliamentarian Anti-Corruption Programmes

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The 'first wave' of donor sponsored anti-corruption programmes usefully focused on elaborating recommendations for parliamentarians or tried to train them (develop human capital) in anti-corruption. Now, it is time for these programmes to take into account parliamentarian incentives to adopt these recommendations and/or use this knowledge. This paper will discuss these incentives and the ways in which these programmes should and can help build political capital by managing voter demands, political competition, patronage and enforcement. The paper also reviews some basic theories from formal political economy, which may be of interest to practitioners interested in bridging the theory-practice gap.

Document Type: Research Article


Publication date: 2007-06-01

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