Dynamics of Mixed Coalitions Under Social Cohesion Constraints

Authors: MARCO, GIUSEPPE DE; ROMANIELLO, MARIA

Source: Mathematical Population Studies, Volume 13, Number 1, Number 1/January-March 2006 , pp. 39-62(24)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

The performance to a collective task may require a certain degree of cooperation among agents. Is cooperation viable in the sense that individual needs are fulfilled, compromises are possible and the task is performed? A model of cooperation is presented in which compromises are also ruled by cohesion among agents. Viability conditions are found associated with regulation law. They say that cooperation increases with cohesion. Moreover, reducing the rapidity of change of cooperation and lowering dissident behavior correct the dynamics so as to turn non viable states into viable ones.

Keywords: dynamic cooperative game; majority game; mixed coalition; cohesion constraint; viability theory

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08898480500452133

Affiliations: 1: Dipartimento di Scienze Aziendali, Università della Calabria, Cosenza, Italia

Publication date: 2006-01-01