Skip to main content

Patents, imitation and welfare

Buy Article:

$47.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

We consider the effects of product and process patents on profits and welfare. In a duopoly model, we show that if the cost of imitation is not very large, prisoner's dilemma occurs under process patent, thus creating lower profit of each firm under process patent than under product patent. Welfare is higher under process (product) patent for very small (not very small) cost of imitation. Although the possibility of cross-licensing never makes lower welfare under process patent for all costs of imitation, welfare is never lower under product patent under infinitely repeated game.
No Reference information available - sign in for access.
No Citation information available - sign in for access.
No Supplementary Data.
No Data/Media
No Metrics

Keywords: Cross-licensing; Prisoner's dilemma; Process patent; Product patent; Repeated game; Welfare

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: 1: School of Economics, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK,The Leverhulme Centre for Research in Globalisation and Economic Policy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK 2: Department of Economics and Finance, College of Business, Tennessee State University, Nashville, USA

Publication date: 2007-04-01

More about this publication?
  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more