Property rights on the internet: is a specific institutional framework needed?

Author: Eric Brousseau

Source: Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Volume 13, Number 5, July 2004 , pp. 489-507(19)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $50.43 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

Digital technologies allow the implementation of more decentralized Property Rights (PR) systems as compared to those traditionally set-up by public authorities at the national level. The self-implementation of exclusive rights of use over information and the design of self-regulation by virtual communities enable agents to set-up and manage PR according to their local constraints and individual preferences. However, a decentralized system has weaknesses. It can result in conflicts and defaults of enforcement that might discourage investments. It can also induce inefficient capture of public goods and favor the development of monopolies. Implementing a last resort authority in charge of limiting and preventing these inefficiencies might result in a more efficient use of resources. Based on the principle of subsidiarity, it should supervise the behaviors of individuals and communities to prevent boundless capture of public wealth by individual interests, to solve conflicts among claims for exclusive rights of use and among local regulations, and to guarantee enforcement when exclusive rights of use are legitimate.

Keywords: Digital economics; Network regulation; Intellectual property rights; Self-regulation; Global governance; Federalism

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1043859042000188737

Publication date: 2004-07-01

More about this publication?