Author: Berkok, Ugurhan

Source: Defence and Peace Economics, Volume 17, Number 5, October 2006 , pp. 473-485(13)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Abstract:

A third country's peacekeeping demand typically arises because of a conflict spilling over the national boundary, economically and politically as well as spatially, from the country in conflict. Economic and geographic proximities, as well as the intensity of the original conflict, increase the demand for peacekeeping by third countries. Moreover, strategic considerations such as free‐riding may significantly alter the level of overall demand for peacekeeping. Discreteness in military technology and leadership by signalling may alleviate the collective action problem and increase peacekeeping contributions towards the optimum from their simple Nash equilibrium levels.

Keywords: Peacekeeping demand; Spatial differentiation; Conflict intensity; Peacekeeping as international public good; Contribution equilibrium; Insurance equilibrium; Leadership by signalling

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242690600888239

Affiliations: 1: Department of Politics and Economics, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Canada, K7K 5L0

Publication date: 2006-10-01

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