An economic analysis of the un peacekeeping assessment system

Author: SHIMIZU, HIROFUMI

Source: Defence and Peace Economics, Volume 16, Number 1, February 2005 , pp. 1-18(18)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

This paper analyzes the effects on UN member states' contribution incentives of an assessment system employed by the United Nations for the financing of its peacekeeping operations. We argue that formal responsibilities placed on a member state by an assessment system increase the damage the country suffers when it under-contributes. The possibility of increasing each member state's contributions by redistributing its assessments across peacekeeping operations is also studied. It is shown that the possibility exists when the undercontributor-specific damage is a function of the arrears-to-assessment ratio, and not of simple arrears.

Keywords: Burden sharing; Joint product model; Peacekeeping; Public goods; United Nations

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1024269052000323515

Publication date: February 1, 2005

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