“We Can't be more Russian than the Russians”: British Policy During the Liman von Sanders Crisis, 1913–1914

Author: Mulligan, William

Source: Diplomacy & Statecraft, Volume 17, Number 2, June 2006 , pp. 261-282(22)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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This article examines British policy in the Liman von Sanders crisis, which arose between Germany and Russia in late 1913. It takes issue with recent arguments that Britain was too closely bound to the Dual Alliance of France and Russia, that concern for her Indian empire determined her foreign policy, and that the Anglo-German cooperation in 1912 and 1913 was a hollow d├ętente. Britain played an important role in resolving the crisis, by restraining an erratic Russian policy and appealing to Germany to make concessions. Moreover, Britain was the dominant power in the entente and influenced French restraint in this crisis. This served Britain's interests in Turkey, which aimed at the strengthening of that state. Finally, the resolution of the crisis demonstrated a functioning international system, based on alliances and the Concert of Europe, not a system on the verge of collapse into war.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592290600695276

Publication date: June 1, 2006

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