Free will and the unconscious precursors of choice
Author: Schlosser, Markus E.
Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 25, Number 3, 1 June 2012 , pp. 365-384(20)
Abstract:Benjamin Libet's empirical challenge to free will has received a great deal of attention and criticism. A standard line of response has emerged that many take to be decisive against Libet's challenge. In the first part of this paper, I will argue that this standard response fails to put the challenge to rest. It fails, in particular, to address a recent follow-up experiment that raises a similar worry about free will (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). In the second part, however, I will argue that we can altogether avoid Libet-style challenges if we adopt a traditional compatibilist account of free will. In the final section, I will briefly explain why there is good and independent reason to think about free will in this way.
Document Type: Research article
Publication date: 2012-06-01