Do discrete emotions exist?

Authors: Barrett, Lisa Feldman; Gendron, Maria; Huang, Yang-Ming

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 22, Number 4, August 2009 , pp. 427-437(11)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

In various guises (usually referred to as the “basic emotion” or “discrete emotion” approach), scientists and philosophers have long argued that certain categories of emotion are natural kinds. In a recent paper, Colombetti (2009) proposed yet another natural kind account, and in so doing, characterized and critiqued psychological constructionist approaches to emotion, including our own Conceptual Act Model. In this commentary, we briefly address three topics raised by Columbetti. First, we correct several common misperceptions about the discrete emotion approach to emotion. Second, we discuss misconceptions of our Conceptual Act Model. Finally, we briefly comment on Columbetti's Dynamical Discrete Emotion model.

Keywords: Affect; Categorization; Emotion

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080903153634

Publication date: 2009-08-01

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