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Pretending to See

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There are three distinct projects-ontological, phenomenological, and conceptual-to pursue in the philosophy of perception. They are, however, rarely distinguished. Failure to distinguish them has resulted in their being pursued as one. Their completion then requires that they admit of the same solution, while accommodating the existence of misperception and the scientific facts concerning the perceptual process. The lesson to learn from misperceptions and those facts is, however, that no such common solution is possible, and that the projects must, and can, be pursued separately. Pursuit of the phenomenological and conceptual projects then requires a context in which discourse concerning objects of perception is permitted without ontological commitment to such objects. This is supplied by treating certain uses of perceptual locutions as within a context of pretense.

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Keywords: Adverbialism; Direct Realism; Indirect Realism; Perception; Pretense; Representationalism

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: 2006-12-01

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