Moral Belief Attribution: a Reply to Roskies

Author: Cholbi, Michael

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 19, Number 5, October 2006 , pp. 629-638(10)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Abstract:

I here defend my earlier doubts that VM patients serve as counterexamples to motivational internalism by highlighting the difficulties of belief attribution in light of holism about the mental and by suggesting that a better understanding of the role of emotions in the self-attribution of moral belief places my earlier Davidsonian “theory of mind” argument in a clearer light.

Keywords: Donald Davidson; Emotion; Moral Belief; Moral Motivation; Motive Internalism; Theory Of Mind

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080600901954

Publication date: 2006-10-01

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