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An Argument Against Dispositionalist HOT Theory

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Abstract:

In this paper we present a two-stage argument against Peter Carruthers' theory of phenomenal consciousness. The first stage shows that Carruthers' main argument against first-order representational theories of phenomenal consciousness applies with equal force against his own theory. The second stage shows that if Carruthers can escape his own argument against first-order theories, it will come at the cost of wedding his theory to certain unwelcome implausibilities. §1 discusses Carruthers' argument against first-order representationalism. §2 presents Carruthers' theory of consciousness. §3 presents our argument against Carruthers' theory. §4 sums up.

Keywords: Dispositional HOT Theory; Dispositional Properties; Peter Carruthers; Phenomenal Consciousness; Representational Theories of Consciousness

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080600729348

Publication date: August 1, 2006

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