Defending Non-Derived Content

Authors: Aizawa, Ken; Adams, Fred

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 18, Number 6, Number 6/December 2005 , pp. 661-669(9)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Abstract:

In “The Myth of Original Intentionality,” Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality. Humans lack original intentionality.Humans have derived intentionality only.There is no distinction between original and derived intentionality. There is no such thing as original intentionality. We argue that Dennett's discussion fails to secure any of these conclusions for the contents of thoughts.

Keywords: Original Intentionality; Derived Intentionality; Daniel Dennett

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080500355186

Publication date: 2005-12-01

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