Divided brains and unified phenomenology: a review essay on michael tye's consciousness and persons

Author: Bayne, Tim

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 18, Number 4, August 2005 , pp. 495-512(18)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to apply his account of the unity of consciousness to the split-brain syndrome. I provide a critical evaluation of Tye's account of the unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080500229993

Publication date: August 1, 2005

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