Objects, places, and perception

Author: Jonathan Cohen

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 17, Number 4, December 2004 , pp. 471-495(25)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

In Clark (2000) , Austen Clark argues convincingly that a widespread view of perception as a complicated kind of feature-extraction is incomplete. He argues that perception has another crucial representational ingredient: it must also involve the representation of "sensory individuals" that exemplify sensorily extracted features. Moreover, he contends, the best way of understanding sensory individuals takes them to be places in space surrounding the perceiver. In this paper, I'll agree with Clark's case for sensory individuals (§1). However, I shall argue against his view of sensory individuals as places (§2). Instead, I'll propose and defend an alternative account of sensory individuals that construes the latter as (visual) objects (§§3-5).

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0951508042000304180

Publication date: 2004-12-01

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