Swampman's revenge: squabbles among the representationalists

Authors: Fred Adams; Laura Dietrich

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 17, Number 3, September 2004 , pp. 323-340(18)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties (and events). Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal states or not? Dretske and Tye disagree on this issue. We try to settle the dispute in favor of Dretske's theory (to our own surprise).

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0951508042000286712

Publication date: 2004-09-01

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