@article {Dunlop:2004:0951-5089:77,
title = "Mentalese semantics and the naturalized mind",
journal = "Philosophical Psychology",
parent_itemid = "infobike://routledg/cphp",
publishercode ="routledg",
year = "2004",
volume = "17",
number = "1",
publication date ="2004-03-01T00:00:00",
pages = "77-94",
itemtype = "ARTICLE",
issn = "0951-5089",
eissn = "1465-394X",
url = "https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2004/00000017/00000001/art00005",
doi = "doi:10.1080/0951508042000202390",
author = "Dunlop, Charles",
abstract = "In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, that the ontological commitments of intentional psychology survive within a broader conception of naturalism than the one adopted by Fodor.",
}