After objectivity: an empirical study of moral judgment

Author: Nichols S.

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 17, Number 1, March 2004 , pp. 3-26(24)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

This paper develops an empirical argument that the rejection of moral objectivity leaves important features of moral judgment intact. In each of five reported experiments, a number of participants endorsed a nonobjectivist claim about a canonical moral violation. In four of these experiments, participants were also given a standard measure of moral judgment, the moral/conventional task. In all four studies, participants who respond as nonobjectivists about canonical moral violations still treat such violations in typical ways on the moral/conventional task. In particular, participants who give moral nonobjectivist responses still draw a clear distinction between canonical moral and conventional violations. Thus there is some reason to think that many of the central characteristics of moral judgment are preserved in the absence of a commitment to moral objectivity.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0951508042000202354

Publication date: 2004-03-01

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