Projectivist representationalism and color

Author: Wright W.

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 16, Number 4, December 2003 , pp. 515-533(19)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

This paper proposes a subjectivist approach to color within the framework of an externalist form of representationalism about phenomenal consciousness. Motivations are presented for accepting both representationalism and color subjectivism, and an argument is offered against the case made by Michael Tye on behalf of the claim that colors are objective, physical properties of objects. In the face of the considerable difficulties associated with finding a workable realist theory of color, the alternative account of color experience set out, projectivist representationalism, claims that the color properties we encounter in experience exist only in the representational contents of our experiences. Color experiences are caused by the physical structure of objects, but objects are never actually colored and color experiences systematically misrepresent objects as colored. However, despite being an error theory of color, projectivist representationalism does not do violence to our everyday use and understanding of color concepts and terms, nor does it undermine the role of color experience in aiding the perceiving subject in navigating through the world.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0951508032000121823

Publication date: 2003-12-01

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