IngentaConnect Broad versus narrow content in the explanation of action: Fodor o...

Author: Wakefield J. C.

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 15, Number 2, 1 June 2002 , pp. 119-133(15)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Abstract:

A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ""Frege cases"" - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor (The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an explanatorily adequate broad-content psychology is nonetheless possible because Frege cases rarely occur in intentional-explanatory contexts, and they are not systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that demands intentional explanation. Thus, he claims, behaviors associated with Frege cases can be considered ceteris-paribus exceptions to broad-content intentional laws without significantly decreasing the explanatory power of intentional psychology. I argue that Frege cases are plentiful and systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that requires intentional explanation, specifically in the explanation of why certain actions are not performed. Consequently, Frege-case behaviors cannot be construed as ceteris-paribus exceptions to intentional laws without significantly eroding the explanatory power of intentional psychology and reducing the rationality of the agent. Fodor thus fails to save broad-content psychology from the prima facie objections against it based on Frege cases.

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Broad versus narrow content in the explanation of action: Fodor on Frege cases