Emotion and action

Authors: Zhu J.; Thagard P.

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 15, Number 1, 1 March 2002 , pp. 19-36(18)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

The role of emotion in human action has long been neglected in the philosophy of action. Some prevalent misconceptions of the nature of emotion are responsible for this neglect: emotions are irrational; emotions are passive; and emotions have only an insignificant impact on actions. In this paper we argue that these assumptions about the nature of emotion are problematic and that the neglect of emotion"s place in theories of action is untenable. More positively, we argue on the basis of recent research in cognitive neuroscience that emotions may significantly affect action generation as well as action execution and control. Moreover, emotions also play a crucial role in people"s explanation of action. We conclude that the concept of emotion deserves a more distinctive and central place in philosophical theories of action.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2002-03-01

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