Synaesthesia misrepresented

Author: Wager, Adam

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 14, Number 3, 1 September 2001 , pp. 347-351(5)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Buy & download fulltext article:

OR

Price: $54.28 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

Gray argues that my three earlier counterexamples fail to refute representational theories of phenomenal character. I maintain that, despite Gray's arguments, each example does in fact work against the particular representational theory at which it is targeted. Further, I question whether my internalism regarding phenomenal character and Gray's externalism regarding modularity are in genuine conflict with one another.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080120072659

Publication date: September 1, 2001

More about this publication?
Related content

Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content

Text size:

A | A | A | A
Share this item with others: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages. print icon Print this page