Mental representation and the subjectivity of consciousness
Author: Mandik, Pete
Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 14, Number 2, 1 June 2001 , pp. 179-202(24)
Abstract:Many have urged that the biggest obstacles to a physicalistic understanding of consciousness are the problems raised in connection with the subjectivity of consciousness. These problems are most acutely expressed in consideration of the knowledge argument against physicalism. I develop a novel account of the subjectivity of consciousness by explicating the ways in which mental representations may be perspectival. Crucial features of my account involve analogies between the representations involved in sensory experience and the ways in which pictorial representations exhibit perspectives or points of view. I argue that the resultant account of subjectivity provides a basis for the strongest response physicalists can give to the knowledge argument.
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: 2001-06-01