The pain problem: reply to Garfield

Author: Dartnall T.1

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 14, Number 1, 1 March 2001 , pp. 109-112(4)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

I am grateful for Garfield"s comments, which clarify my position. He says, for example, that I am a phenomenalist. I am not a phenomenalist. I say that there can be contents of consciousness that we are not aware of, in the same sense that there really is a chair next door and a gorilla outside my window-a real, live gorilla, with big teeth and no conditional statements. His other comments are equally illuminating.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Computing and Information Technology, Griffith University, Nathan, Australia

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