Theory of mind, logical form and eliminativism
Author: Collins J.
Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 13, Number 4, 1 December 2000 , pp. 465-490(26)
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Abstract:
I argue for a cognitive architecture in which folk psychology is supported by an interface of a ToM module and the language faculty, the latter providing the former with interpreted LF structures which form the content representations of ToM states. I show that LF structures satisfy a range of key features asked of contents. I confront this account of ToM with eliminativism and diagnose and combat the thought that "success" and innateness are inconsistent with the falsity of folk psychology. I show that, while my ensemble account of ToM and language refutes the culturalist presuppositions that tend to underlie eliminativist arguments, the falsity of folk psychology is consistent with the account.Language: English
Document Type: Research article
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