@article {Borrett:2000:0951-5089:261,
title = "Bridging embodied cognition and brain function: the role of phenomenology",
journal = "Philosophical Psychology",
parent_itemid = "infobike://routledg/cphp",
publishercode ="routledg",
year = "2000",
volume = "13",
number = "2",
publication date ="2000-06-01T00:00:00",
pages = "261-266",
itemtype = "ARTICLE",
issn = "0951-5089",
eissn = "1465-394X",
url = "https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2000/00000013/00000002/art00009",
doi = "doi:10.1080/09515080050075744",
author = "Borrett, Donald and Kelly, Sean and Kwan, Hon",
abstract = "Both cognitive science and phenomenology accept the primacy of the organism-environment system and recognize that cognition should be understood in terms of an embodied agent situated in its environment. How embodiment is seen to shape our world, however, is fundamentally different in these two disciplines. Embodiment, as understood in cognitive science, reduces to a discussion of the consequences of having a body like ours interacting with our environment and the relationship is one of contingent causality. Embodiment, as understood phenomenologically, represents the condition of intelligibility of certain terms in our experience and, as such, refers to one aspect of that background which presupposes our understanding of the world. The goals and approach to modeling an embodied agent in its environment are also fundamentally different dependent on which relationship is addressed. These differences are highlighted and are used to support our phenomenologically based approach to organism-environment interaction and its relationship to brain function.",
}