Schneider’s apraxia and the strained relation between experience and description
Borrett, Kelly and Kwan [(2000) Phenomenology, dynamical neural networks and brain function, Philosophical Psychology, 13, 000-000] claim that unbiased, self-evident, direct description is possible, and may supply the data that brain theories account for. Merleau-Ponty's [(1962) Phenomenology of perception, London: Routledge] description of Schneider's apraxia is offered as a case in point. According to the authors, Schneider's apraxia justifies brain components of predicative and pre-predicative experience. The description derives from a bias, however, that parallels modularity's morphological reduction. The presence of biasing presuppositions contradicts the goal of direct description. Moreover, the authors' brain account is not necessary to explain Schneider's apraxia, and morphological reduction is not sufficient to explain emergent phenomena of motor control.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Cognitive Systems Group, Arizona State University, Department of Psychology, Tempe, AZ 85287-1104, USA
Publication date: 2000-06-01