Searle’s unconscious mind

Author: Dunlop, Charles E.M.

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 13, Number 1, 1 March 2000 , pp. 123-126(4)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

In his book The rediscovery of the mind John Searle claims that unconscious mental states (1) have first-person “aspectual shape”, but (2) that their ontology is purely third-person. He attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistency by arguing that the aspectual shape of unconscious mental states consists in their ability to cause conscious first-person states. However, I show that this attempted solution fails insofar as it covertly acknowledges that unconscious states lack the aspectual shape required for them to play a role in psychological explanation.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080050002771

Publication date: March 1, 2000

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