Qualia, Space, and Control
Author: Mandik, Pete
Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 12, Number 1, 1 March 1999 , pp. 47-60(14)
Abstract:According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation is about its effects instead of its causes. I discuss conceptual and empirical points that favor a procedural representationalism for our experience of space.
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: 1999-03-01