Concepts: where Fodor Went Wrong

Authors: Levine A.; Bickhard M. H.

Source: Philosophical Psychology, Volume 12, Number 1, 1 March 1999 , pp. 5-23(19)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

In keeping with other recent efforts, Fodor"s CONCEPTS focuses on the metaphysics of conceptual content, bracketing such epistemological questions as, "How can we know the contents of our concepts?" Fodor"s metaphysical account of concepts, called "informational atomism," stipulates that the contents of a subject"s concepts are fixed by the nomological lockings between the subject and the world. After sketching Fodor"s "what else?" argument in support of this view, we offer a number of related criticisms. All point to the same conclusion: Fodor is ultimately not merely bracketing the epistemology of conceptual content; his theory makes answers to the epistemological questions impossible.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

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