Conclusive reasons that we perceive sets
Author: MacCallum, David
Source: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 14, Number 1, 1 March 2000 , pp. 25-42(18)
Abstract:Penelope Maddy has defended a modified version of mathematical platonism that involves the perception of some sets. Frederick Suppe has developed a conclusive reasons account of empirical knowledge that, when applied to the sets of interest to Maddy, yields that we have knowledge of these sets. Thus, Benacerraf's challenge to the platonist to account for mathematical knowledge has been met, at least in part. Moreover, it is argued that the modalities involved in Suppe's conclusive reasons account of knowledge can be handled without recourse to either laws of nature or possible worlds, and that this approach is preferable.
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: March 1, 2000