Psychological Emptiness in the Zhuangzi
Author: Fraser, Chris
Source: Asian Philosophy, Volume 18, Number 2, July 2008 , pp. 123-147(25)
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Abstract:
Three views of psychological emptiness, or xu, can be found in the Zhuangzi˘. The instrumental view values xu primarily as a means of efficacious action. The moderate view assigns it intrinsic value as an element of one Zhuangist vision of the good life. The radical view also takes it to be an element of the ideal life, but in this case the form of life advocated is that of the Daoist sage, who transcends mundane human concerns to merge with nature or the Dao. The instrumental and moderate views articulate a relatively commonsensical position, on which the agent continues to pursue at least some characteristically human projects. On the radical view, by contrast, the agent ceases to exercise agency and lives a life hardly recognizable as human. The three views thus signal a tension in Zhuangist ethics, and the unattractiveness of the radical view poses a potential obstacle to the application of Daoist ideas in contemporary ethical discourse. The paper argues that there are principled grounds within Zhuangist thought for detaching the instrumental and moderate views from the radical view and rejecting the latter.Document Type: Research article
DOI: 10.1080/09552360802218025
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