@article {Sharadin:2016:0004-8402:343,
title = "Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?",
journal = "Australasian Journal of Philosophy",
parent_itemid = "infobike://routledg/ajphil",
publishercode ="routledg",
year = "2016",
volume = "94",
number = "2",
publication date ="2016-04-02T00:00:00",
pages = "343-361",
itemtype = "ARTICLE",
issn = "0004-8402",
eissn = "1471-6828",
url = "https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/2016/00000094/00000002/art00009",
doi = "doi:10.1080/00048402.2015.1068348",
keyword = "evidentialism, rationality of belief, epistemology, transparency, exclusivity, doxastic deliberation",
author = "Sharadin, Nathaniel P.",
abstract = "A number of philosophers have claimed that non-evidential considerations cannot play a role in doxastic deliberation as motivating reasons to believe a proposition. This claim, interesting in its own right, naturally lends itself to use in a range of arguments for a wide array of substantive
philosophical theses. I argue, by way of a counterexample, that the claim to which all these arguments appeal is false. I then consider, and reply to, seven objections to my counterexample. Finally, as a way of softening the blow, I show how the counterexample itself suggests a plausible diagnosis
of why this claim has seemed so plausible to so many.",
}