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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?

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A number of philosophers have claimed that non-evidential considerations cannot play a role in doxastic deliberation as motivating reasons to believe a proposition. This claim, interesting in its own right, naturally lends itself to use in a range of arguments for a wide array of substantive philosophical theses. I argue, by way of a counterexample, that the claim to which all these arguments appeal is false. I then consider, and reply to, seven objections to my counterexample. Finally, as a way of softening the blow, I show how the counterexample itself suggests a plausible diagnosis of why this claim has seemed so plausible to so many.
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Keywords: doxastic deliberation; epistemology; evidentialism; exclusivity; rationality of belief; transparency

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Syracuse University,

Publication date: 02 April 2016

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