Seeing red, the metaphysics of colours without the physics

Author: Watkins, Michael

Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 83, Number 1, March 2005 , pp. 33-52(20)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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By treating colours as sui generis intrinsic properties of objects we can maintain that (1) colours are causally responsible for colour experiences (and so agree with the physicalist) and (2) colours, along with the similarity and difference relations that colours bear to one another, are presented to us by casual observation (and so agree with the dispositionalist). The major obstacle for such a view is the causal overdetermination of colour experience. Borrowing and expanding on the works of Sydney Shoemaker and Stephen Yablo, the paper offers a solution.

Document Type: Research Article


Affiliations: Auburn University and Dalhousie University

Publication date: March 1, 2005

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