Seeing red, the metaphysics of colours without the physics
Author: Watkins, Michael
Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 83, Number 1, March 2005 , pp. 33-52(20)
Abstract:By treating colours as sui generis intrinsic properties of objects we can maintain that (1) colours are causally responsible for colour experiences (and so agree with the physicalist) and (2) colours, along with the similarity and difference relations that colours bear to one another, are presented to us by casual observation (and so agree with the dispositionalist). The major obstacle for such a view is the causal overdetermination of colour experience. Borrowing and expanding on the works of Sydney Shoemaker and Stephen Yablo, the paper offers a solution.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Auburn University and Dalhousie University
Publication date: March 1, 2005