Why Zombies Are Inconceivable

In this: publication
By this: publisher
By this author: Eric Marcus

Author: Eric Marcus

Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 82, Number 3, September 01, 2004 , pp. 477-490(14)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $50.43 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they must involve first-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, cannot . Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have unwittingly conflated imagining a creature who lacks consciousness with imagining a creature without also imagining the consciousness it may or may not possess.

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2004-09-01