Presentism and Consciousness

Author: Neil McKinnon

Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 81, Number 3, September 01, 2003 , pp. 305-323(19)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content

Abstract:

The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1093/ajp/jag301

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$38.34 plus tax      Refund Policy

 

OR

Back to top

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content
Share this item with others: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
Page Help Click here for Page Help
Shopping cart
Tools
Sign in






Need to register?
Sign up here
Text size: A | A | A | A