Self-Knowledge Via Inner Observation of External Objects?

Author: A. Brueckner¹

Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 81, Number 1, March 01, 2003 , pp. 118-122(5)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Abstract:

Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts.

Document Type: Discussion

Affiliations: 1: University of California, Santa Barbara

Links for this article

http://www.ingentaconnect.com/routledg/ajphil/2003/00000081/00000001/art00118
http://openurl.ingenta.com/content?genre=article&issn=0004-8402&volume=81&issue=1&spage=118&epage=122